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 Botnet-based attack is dangerous and extremely difficult to overcome as all 
the primary mitigation methods are passive and limited in focus. A combine 
efforts of internet service providers (ISPs) are better guides since they can 
monitor the traffic that traverse through their networks. However, ISPs are 
not legally banded to this role and may not view security as a primary 
concern. Towards understudying the involvement of ISPs in Botnet 
mitigation in Nigeria, this study elicited and summarized mitigation 
measures from scientific literatures to create a reference model which was 
validated by structured interview. Although, ISPs role is seen to be voluntary 
and poorly incentivized, the providers still take customers security very 
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A network of infected computers or machines is called a Botnet and each of these computers is 
referred to as a Bot. Hence, a botnet is a connection of compromised computers controlled by a Botmaster 
who distributes attacks over hundreds of computers across the Internet [1]. The cumulative bandwidth and 
large number of attacks make botnet-based attacks dangerous and difficult to overcome. In 2009 for instance, 
BredoLab created an estimated thirty million bots, the ‘Star Wars’ twitter botnet. Though its purpose is still 
unknown, the botnet is said to have compromised over 350,000 twitter accounts [2]. One of the popular and 
largest botnets attack was Citadel [3] where keyloggers were installed onto victim’s computers thereby 
enabling botmaster to monitor keystrokes on the infected systems. Over five million keystrokes of users 
across the globe were logged resulting to over five hundred million dollars loss [1, 3]. 
Unlike other Internet malware, the control communication network of a botnet is its unique feature. 
As illustrated in Figure 1 with the arrows showing the direction of network connections, bots in the botnet 
connect to special hosts - command-and-control (C&C) servers, who forward commands from botmaster to 
the other bots in the network for a possible attack.  
Nigeria is a country with a very high internet coverage with quality wired and wireless connections. 
Unfortunately, she is a key player in cybercrime and has become an ideal target for botnets being a major 
source of Spam [4, 5]. This may be linked to the fast growth of Internet usage owing to the explosion of 
internet service providers (ISPs) - organisations that provide Internet services as well as software packages 
and e-mail accounts [6]. 
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Figure 1. How a botnet work [7] 
 
 
Prior to 2013, four primary methods commonly being used to mitigate DDoS attacks were 
commercial security software, criminal enforcement, botnet seizure by federal agencies, and private civil 
action [8]. However, such efforts, though valuable, are passive and limited by their focus on prevention  
[9, 10]. A leading cloud based service provider, CloudFlare, therefore offered DDoS protection capable of 
matching sophisticated DDoS attacks. This was more effective but Sood et al., [3] and Lone et al., [8] argued 
that improved result is possible with boundless and collaborative efforts of both the private and public 
organizations in Nigeria including the ISPs, economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC) and 
Cybercrime Prevention Working Group. This study therefore aims at investigating the role of ISPs in Nigeria 
towards ascertaining their capability of combating botnets in isolation. Following a review of related studies 
in the next section, an overview of incentives that attract ISPs to botnet mitigation is provided along with  
a reference model, while a table of mitigation measures for ISP are summarized in the later part of this study. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
Modular Integrated Services Limited [11] highlighted a bigger picture of numerous 
recommendations developed by International Telecommunication Union to secure telecommunications 
infrastructure and associated services or applications where implementation of the international information 
society management standard was presented as the most comprehensive approach to combat botnet. 
Nonetheless, quantitative analysis [7, 8] have always presenting ISPs as the better guide against botnets due 
to their functional indispensable responsibilities. Nabil [12] therefore gave a classification that reflects  
the lifecycle and current resilience techniques of botnets by analysing commonalities from a network 
providers’ perspective to design and implement mitigation strategies against botnets. 
ISPs view customers-security role as voluntary since they have no legal binding to secure their 
customers [6] but they are in an optimal position to provide security to internet users [9]. Meanwhile, 
Empirical study and literature review of Timo et al. [5] claimed that no organisation can effectively combat 
botnets in isolation but in conjunction with one and other. However, Van Eeten et al. [13], recognised ISPs as 
a key control point, in their study of spam traffic where data were collected on the location of infected 
machines over time to examine the role of ISPs in mitigating botnets. This validates Stamatoudi’s functional 
definition of an ISP as “a passive carrier that must block material access upon receiving notice of an alleged 
malware” [14]. 
Noting that ISPs in Nigeria may be unaware of the vulnerabilities the use of their infrastructure is 
posing, Longe et al., [1] conducted a survey on the impact of ISPs against botnet. Leaving chi-square at 0.05 
level of significance, their descriptive statistics showed that the level of security provided against crime by 
ISPs are relatively low resulting in a positive relationship between the level of internet crime and the attitudes 
of ISPs to their networks safety. Hence, Brent et al., [9] believed that ISPs should be motivated and therefore 
proposed a further study to identify how best ISPs could be incentivised. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
A literature survey and empirical study were conducted to examine mitigation measures (Nigerian) 
ISPs have taken, those they could have taken, and others they plan to take against botnet. This specific was to 
identify botnets C&C-structures and their relevant features. A ‘reference model’ summarising mitigation 
measures such as technical, organisational and juridical measures was used. The empirical study was 
restricted to Nigeria as interviews were conducted to validate results obtained from the literature study.  
The interviewees are security officers and service managers at top Nigerian ISPs who have a clear 
understanding of the incentives and mitigation measures. 
 
 
4. ISPs AND SECURITY INCENTIVES 
Since ISPs know what traffic traverses their network, they are in the best position to detect 
malicious traffics and quarantine the infected computers in their network [4]. Hence, they are mostly 
expected to take the responsibility of mitigating spam, computer viruses, fraudulent email, and spyware [15] 
However, since they are not the root cause of attacks and mitigation comes with its own cost, ISPs  
may be unwilling to take action if the responsibility does not attract incentives/factors. Hence, Quantitative  
analysis [7, 8] attributes lack of incentives as a major factor responsible for a low action rate in botnet 
mitigation since. Since ISPs naturally respond to economic (customers support, price, etc.) and non-economic 
(peer pressure, peer recognition, etc.) incentives [16], incentives are those factors considered by both  
the individual and organizational decision-makers to mitigate botnets. 
 
4.1. Organisational incentives 
These are factors that ISPs have some levels of controls over which may include business model. 
priority given to security, cyber-insurance, awareness and training, participation in security efforts, size  
of customer base, cost of customer support, cost of management abuse, and cost of infrastructure  
expansion [17]. The bigger ISPs generally perform better but they experience high security attacks and 
possibly high invention [16], thereby invest more in cyber-insurance.  Similarly, the higher the usage of 
pirated software, the higher the ISP’s exposure to botnet, and the higher the security awareness of customers 
and staff, the higher the competences and the lower the level of botnet attacks. 
Since “Very large ISPs are effectively exempted from peer pressure as others cannot afford to cut 
them off, much of the world bad traffic comes from the networks of these too big to block‟ providers” [14]. 
However, large ISPs has lower infection rates than small ISPs [17] because they are highly automated to 
identify, notify and mitigate infected customers thereby making the mitigation process economically  
efficient [4]. 
 
4.2. Institutional incentives 
These are factors beyond ISPs’ direct control but instituted by the policy makers or market 
conditions. They are defined legal frameworks in which ISPs operate and include cyber-security laws and 
regulations, blacklisting, peer pressure, reputation effects, competitive cost pressure, cost of customer 
acquisition, and cost of technology mitigation [17]. Regulation - an effective incentive [18] - requires cyber 
security incidents be nationally mitigated [19] since national anti-botnet centre usually are hardly infected. 
National initiatives on botnet mitigation should therefore be promoted and good models circulated [20] while 
policy makers give ISPs more incentives for taking action [2]. Hence, ISPs are being pushed by regulatory 
bodies such as internet engineering task force (IETF) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to clean-up their customers infected computers [21]. 
Where ISPs are mostly driven by institutional incentives, they are expected to perform same in terms 
of botnet mitigation as incentive structure may have to be changed if they are to increase their efforts [16]. 
However, since ISPs perform very differently when exposed to both comparable institutional incentives and 
economic circumstances [16], the country-level mitigation measures cannot be sufficient unless 
organizational incentives are addressed and realigned together. 
 
4.3. Organisational vs institutional incentives 
The incentive structure of an ISP is a function of the institutional and organizational  
factors – the sets that are closely interrelated and very difficult to separate. While policy makers postulate 
institutional incentives, organizational ones are being determined by the individual ISPs in line with  
the institutional incentives. Much [18, 22] have been done on the incentives of ISPs to improve security, and 
some have been identified as enhancing security while others work against it.  However, the net effects of 
these incentives on each ISP is still unclear as the ISPs behave differently when exposed to similar 
incentives. It is therefore important to know how much discretion each ISP has for botnet mitigation. Every 
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ISP should decide how to mitigate botnet and determine their organisational incentives even when faced with 
a common set of institutional incentives as defined by the country legal framework [16]. ISPs’ attitude 
towards botnet mitigation is mostly determined by institutional incentives. However, their varying behaviour 
when subjected to same incentives suggests that legal framework on its own cannot be sufficient to mitigate 
botnet unless organisational incentives are also addressed and properly aligned [8]. 
 
4.4. Best practices and incentives 
Although, most Nigerian organisations are ill-equipped to mitigate malware threats, studies have 
shown that organisations cannot effectively mitigate botnet in isolation [5]. Both private and public 
organisations collaborate to fight botnet but the individuals and corporate entities in the private sector still 
remains the biggest victim of cybercrime [23-25]. Towards fighting against all forms of financial and  
cyber-crimes therefore EFCC was setup and empowered by Nigerian government to work hand in hand with 
the cybercrime Prevention Working Group to combat financial crimes. 
Internationally, organizations such as anti-phishing working group (APWG), communications 
security, reliability and interoperability (CSRIC), European network and information security agency 
(ENISA), IT Association for telecommunications, messaging, malware, and mobile anti-abuse working group 
(M3AAWG), and online trust alliance (OTA) have come together for the sole purpose of mitigating  
botnet. Different initiatives such as internet exchange point of Nigeria (IXPN) and Association of 
Telecommunications Companies of Nigeria are empowering stakeholders on capacity building and 
encouraging synergy amongst the various agencies. This is because training, awareness, and public 
empowerment on cyber security services, strategy, and intelligent building should go ahead of cyber 
criminals [1, 26], as public and private organisations have to reconsider their approaches to cyber threats in 
order to establish the required security practices on the critical IT infrastructure [23]. ISPs should therefore 
consider, as a top practice, awareness and training, continuous monitoring and log analysis, vulnerability and 
patch management, continuous risk assessment and treatment, management services and independent  
reviews [23]. Nigeria as a country, also has to continuously invest in research, build local cyber threat 
management infrastructure to improve her ability to anticipate, detect, respond and contain cyber threats. 
 
 
5. THE REFERENCE MODEL 
This section presents a reference model (Table 1) similar to [4] where botnet mitigation measures 
for ISP are summarised. The model is in line with structure of anti-botnet lifecycle and ecosystem defined by 
the online trust alliance - OTA [20]. The sequence of the five stages - prevention, detection, notification, 
remediation and recovery - makes up an anti-botnet lifecycle presented in Figure 2 where: 
 Prevention - proactive measures of an ISP to avert user’s devices from potential attacks. 
 Detection - measures to identify threats, vulnerabilities or attacks on the ISP’s network. 
 Notification: measures taken by ISP to alert customers of security breaches. 
 Remediation: corrective measures initiated by an ISP to clean compromised system of malicious 
software. 





Figure 2. Anti-botnet lifecycle [4] 
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5.1. Mitigation measures 
Telecommunications Act [27] mandates ISPs to protect their customers against cybercrime 
following Technical, organizational and legal measures as postulated by Asghari [28]. Similarly, ISPs are 
expected to tell their customers the risks related to the use of web services they offered by the ISPs, as well as 
what customers ought to do to scale down these risks. However, the Act [27] is silent on the role of ISPs 
when botnet is detected in its network thereby implying that ISPs action against botnet is not obligated  
by law. Having elaborated on the general botnet mitigation measures, this study adapted those measures 
derived by [4] to determine whether each measure observed by ISPs is aimed at their customers, the ISP  
itself or other stakeholders. The study is also aiming at knowing whether the measure is technical, 
organizational, or legal. The research findings are as presented on Table 1 following a detailed explanation of 
the lifecycle stage. 
 
 
Table 1. The reference model 
Target set Aspect Description Technical Organizational Legal 
PREVENTION      
Customer PC-1 Customers are provided with endpoint security solutions o o  
PC-2 Customers are always educated on botnet threats and mitigation o o o 
Other PO-3 ISPs share information on botnet mitigation through 
collaboration 
 o  
PO-4 There is collaborative initiatives for botnet mitigation  o  
ISP PI-5 Intrusion prevention system (IPS) is being applied o   
PI-6 Technical measures are applied against botnet infections o   
PI-7 Information regarding botnet mitigation is always up to date o o  
PI-8 There is process for customer support  o  
PI-9 There is service level agreements (SLA)  o  
PI-10 Security standards is adhered to  o  
DETECTION      
Customer DC-1 Self-identity portal is presented   o 
DC-2 ISPs receive information on possible botnet attacks   o 
Other DO-3 Detected (botnet) infections is broadcasted   o 
DO-4 External parties provide information on possible infection   o 
DO-5 Information on possible attack are received from AbuseHub    
ISP DI-6 Honeynet is applied o   
DI-7 Intrusion detection system (IDS) is applied o  o 
DI-8 Infections are actively validated o   
DI-9 Abuse team is put in place   o 
NOTIFICATION      
Customer NC-1 Infected customers are notified  o  
NC-2 Notifications are provided with remediation tools o o  
Other NO-3 Other providers are notified about infections  o  
REMEDIATION      
Customer RC-1 Infected customers are isolated o o  
RC-2 Information to mitigate potential botnet attacks is publicised o o  
RC-3 Links for professional supports are provided in case of infection  o  
Customer/Other RV-4 information on walled garden procedure is shared  o  
Other RO-5 Best practices for removal of infections is shared  o  
RECOVERY      
Customer Re-1 Customer’s internet connection is activated o o  
Re-2 Customers are supported on recovery process  o  
Re-3 Customers are informed of the potential impacts of recovery on 
personal data and accounts 




Prevention is the first and most important security measure against potential cyber-attacks. 
Anticipatory measures such as anti-virus, anti-worms and secured routers are good endpoint security 
solutions (PC-1) that have proven effective against botnet infections when provided by the ISPs. Similarly, 
ISPs usually come up with series of security awareness programmes (training, conferences, etc.) to raise their 
customers’ awareness on botnet threats and mitigation (PC-2). Countries have associations (national and 
international) of ISPs and institutions (cyber security centre, etc.) where issues regarding security are 
discussed and initiatives to mitigate botnets are developed (PO-4). They collaborate to share information and 
experiences towards mitigating botnets (PO-3). 
Having realized that the safety of their customers’ data also lies on the platform [8, 14], ISPs 
embrace measures that safeguard their operations and infrastructures. They update themselves with security 
information (PI-7) and apply intrusion prevention system - IPS (PI-5) and other technical measures against 
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bonets infections (PI-6). By embracing effective customers’ supports processes (PI-8) with adequate SLAs 
(PI-9), they adhere strictly to industrial security standards including ISO 27006:2007 and 27002:2005 (PI-10). 
 
5.3. Detection 
Even when adequate preventions are in place, security breaches may still occur leading to system 
being infected and added to a botnet. This is because control may not be total especially in risk management 
processes such as change management where process failure is possible. Detective control is therefore 
required to identify errors, irregularities or attacks after their occurrences [10, 29]. Botnet detection can be 
classified by botmasters, bots or C&C servers.  The detection could be active if classified by honeynets but 
passive if by IDS using either DNS-based, host-based, network-based or hybrid-detection [4]. However, for 
reasons yet to be fully investigated, ISPs prefer to focus on bots. 
ISPs provide portals that allow their customers to self-identify bot-malware infection (DC-1) and in 
return, obtain information on possible attack from customers (DC-2). Similarly, ISPs share information on 
detected botnet infections with other shareholders (DC-3) and in return, receive information on possible 
attacks from both the AbuseHub (DO-5) and external parties (DO-4). ISPs apply IDSs (DI-7) to detect issues 
on their network, and honeynets (DI-6) for security issues around their internal operation and infrastructure. 
On detection of any infection, they validate the attack (DI-8) to avoid false positive and subsequently 
institute abuse team to handle the infection (DI-9). 
 
5.4. Notification 
An infected customer should be notified by ISPs (NC-1) once an infection is detected. Other ISPs 
should be adequately informed (NC-3) as well to increase awareness and avoid reoccurrence. Notification 




Upon detection of infections and notifying the stakeholders (customers and other peer ISPs), ISPs 
take immediate remediation measures to address the compromised systems of a botnet.  In which case, 
infected customers are isolated (RC-1) and Information to mitigate potential botnet attacks is publicised  
(RC-2) while links for professional supports are given to the customer (RC-3). Best practices for removal of 
infections is shared only to the stakeholders (RO-5) but information on processes to deal with the isolated 
compromised system is shared to both the customers and other stakeholders (RV-4). 
 
5.6. Recovery 
This is the final step of the mitigation measures and it is more of an extension of remediation stage. 
Once the infection is removed, ISPs reactivate customers’ internet connection (Re-1) and provide effective 
customer supports throughout the recovery process (Re-2). Before recovery process commences, ISPs do 




6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section validates the reference model used in this empirical study and interpreted the results 
discussed. The interviewees examined every part of the reference model for completeness and correctness to 
ascertain the validity and reliability of the research instrument. Common follow-up actions of mitigating 
botnets include: shutting down C&C-servers, hijacking C&C-servers to hack back or infiltration to dismantle 
the botnet from within, remote disinfection of compromised systems, unsolicited termination of customer’s 
contracts after multiple attacks, and blocking of botmalware infected websites. This study recognises  
the importance of these additional actions. However, it does not extend the model to them since both  
the cyber security center (NCSC) and all the ISPs already affirmed that they hardly cover such actions. 
This study also noticed that it is not every aspects of our model that are applicable to every ISP. 
This is depicted on Table 1 and summarised on Table 2 where colour Red represents aspects that are hardly 
applied by ISPs, Tan are adopted by just few ISPs, and Orange colour are those applied by all the ISPs in 
Nigeria. Although there are five security aspects that are generally not being attended to by the ISPs and nine 
others are being patronised by only a few, 16 out of 30 (representing 53.33%) security aspects are duly 
practiced by all Nigerian ISPs. 
Despite that they are not the major causes of attacks [27, 30] and botnet is even expensive to 
mitigate, ISPs still take safety against botnet attacks very seriously. Even though, nine security aspects are 
not covered by two of the ISPs for administrative reasons as shown in Table 2, other 16 of 30 are covered by 
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all the seven ISPs leaving only five aspects representing 16.7% not being covered. We notice further on 
Table 1 that these 16 aspects are in ratio 7:5:4 respectively representing customers, ISPs, and others. 
Hence, ISPs give higher priorities to their customers’ safety and are capable of performing advanced 
detection and follow-up actions. 
 
 
Table 2. Nine security aspects 
Descriptions Aspects List No of Aspects No of ISPs 
Aspects which ISPs hardly handle PI5, DC1, DC2, DI6, DI7 5  
Aspects performed by just few ISPs PI6, PI9, DO3, NO3, RC3, RV4, RO5, Re2, Re3 9 5 
Aspects applied by all the ISPs PC1, PC2, PC3, PC4, PI7, PI8, PI10, DO4, DO5, 




Only one out of seven interviewed ISPs implement IPS (PI5) and another one receives information 
on potential botnet attacks (DC2). While none of the ISPs have a portal for customers to self-identify 
potential botnet infection (DC1), only two apply honeynet (DI6) and another two apply IDS (DI7) in their 
networks even though, on a very small scale. The ISPs are generally not performing Deep Packet Inspection 
as they fail to monitor the contents of the traffic generated by their customers. They all attribute this failure to 
possible high running cost and are therefore looking at commercialising the service. 
Some notable numbers of ISPs apply technical measures such as password dualisation against botnet 
infections (PI6). Some offer SLAs to their customers (PI9) to bind their business relationship while others 
broadcast botnet infection when detected (DO3) and even notify other ISPs to raise security awareness 
(NO3). Despite that a good number of ISPs provide links for professional supports in case of infection (RC3), 
information sharing on walled garden procedure (RV4) as well as sharing of best practices for removal of 
infections (RO5) is limited. It is only some ISPs that apply remedial measures such as customer’s  
supports (Re2) and awareness/enlightenment (Re3) on the potential impacts of recovery on personal data  
and accounts. Since prevention of attacks is always better than cure [30, 31], ISPs are directing greater efforts 
on botnet prevention and notification. Even though they are not under any obligation to take such actions, 
they implement customer support processes for adequate prevention and detection [31] but little for 




Fraudulent mails emanating from Nigeria have dented the image of Nigerian internet users. This is 
calling for further effective botnet mitigations as a significant number of systems are continuously being 
attacked. Criminals are increasingly launching sophisticated attacks on internet devices by deploying 
coordinated attacks such as malware threats, insider threats, data breaches (resulting from poor access 
controls) and system misconfigurations. Standard methods of reporting spam events, characterizing particular 
spam, and of sending spam control data may be helpful to fight cybercrime in Nigeria but a collaborative 
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